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LAW OF SEARCHES
to mean that in these cases officers will not be held to as strict a
rule in similar cases as they have been in the past. The rule in the
Zap case is fairly definite and serves as a caveat to persons con-
tracting with the Government. The rule in the Davis case is not
so definite, as it only creates a presumption against the use of
unreasonable force in the case of certain types of property under
certain circumstances. Nevertheless, the latter rule gains in im-
portance when its possible repercussions are considered, and these
effects are accentuated instead of being diminished by the uncer-
tainty of the rule. As a trend in search and seizure decisions these
cases seem to find the court realizing the importance of convicting
guilty defendants, when the evidence shows that they are guilty,
without as much attention as they have previously given to how
the evidence was procured.
THOMAS C. HENDRmIX.
The Hearsay Rule: Time Element in Spontaneous Exclamations
In State v. Stafford,1 in which the defendant was prosecuted for
assault with intent to murder his wife, statements made by her to
her sister and brother-in-law fourteen (14) hours after the alleged
offense were admitted into evidence as part of the "res gestae."
Defendant's wife had been severely beaten, almost beyond recogni-
tion, and seriously injured in a pasture near their home. She
escaped and hid out during the night, wandering about until early
morning when ghe made her way to her sister's home three miles
distant. Her statements as to what had happened were held by
the court to be a "spontaneous exclamation" and as such admissible
in evidence.
The hearsay rule forbids the use of an assertion made out of
court as testimony to the truth of the fact asserted, unless it has
been open to test by cross examination or an opportunity thereof. 2
The reason hearsay is excluded is because of potential infirmities
as to the observation, narration, and veracity of the one who made
the statement; and unless he is available for cross examination the
statement is generally considered untrustworthy.3 To the rule itself
there are, of course, numerous recognized exceptions. 4 All of these
exceptions rest on some special ground, however, and have evolved,
historically, independently of each other. But underlying them all
are two basic thoughts: 1) that some special situation exists that
lessens the risk of untrustworthiness (in effect overcoming the
requirement of cross examination), and 2) that there is a special
necessity for using the particular statement.5
Along with this principle establishing the various exceptions to*
the rule another, and elementary, principle admits statements attrib-
I-- Iowa-, 23. N.W. (2d) 832 (1946).
2 Wigmore on Evidence, (3rd ed., 1940) §§1361-1362.
3 Morgan, "The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945," 59 Harv. L. R. 541
(1946).
4 Examples: 1) Dying Declarations, 2) Statements of Facts Against
Interest, 3) Statements about Family History, 4) Attesting Witness's
Statements, 5) Regular Entries in the Course of Business, 6) Statements
about Private Land Boundaries, 7) Statements of Decedents in General,
8) Reputation about Land, Character, Marriage, etc., 9) Scientific Trea-
tises, 10) Affidavits, 11) Commercial and Professional Lists, etc.,
12) Statements of Physical Sensation and Mental Condition, 13) Official
Statements, and 14) Spontaneous Exclamations under Excitement.
Wigmore, supra note 2.
5 Wigmore, supra note 2, at §1749.
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uted to persons not in court for cross examination whenever the
statements are offered without reference to the truth of the matter
asserted. Those utterances that form a part of the issue, or are
relevant as circumstantial evidence, or form a verbal part of the
act6 (usually referred to as the "verbal act" doctrine) are thus
admissible, for it follows that when the words are received not as
evidence of the truth of what was declared, but because the speaking
of the words is the fact, or part of the fact, to be investigated then
the hearsay rule would not apply. Words spoken concurrently with
an act done are often a part of the act, and give it a precise and
peculiar character, and therefore must be considered as evidence-
not to show that the words are true, but to show that they were,
in fact, spoken.
7
The doctrine of "spontaneous exclamations" s (an exception to
the hearsay rule) and the "verbal act" doctrine (rule is not applic-
able here) are fundamentally different both as to their applications
and their requirements. The great confusion that does exist here
is due largely to the fact that the courts have used the term
"res gestae"--the literal translation of which is "things done," or
"thing transacted"-as a convenient rule of thumb to admit or reject
evidence without first analyzing the problem in the light of the
actual scope and purpose of the hearsay rule. Thayer pointed out
that the term "res gestae" was first used by "Garrow and Lord
Kenyon - two famously ignorant men." 9 This term, if useful at
all, is of value only as to those statements admitted under the second
principle, where the hearsay rule is not even applicable. Yet the
courts have constantly used the term indiscriminately. Thus, in
many cases, while the doctrine of "spontaneous utterances" controls,
it appears in the form of a development of the "res gestae" doctrine.
The courts justify this by holding that there is a "causal connection"
between the accident or act and the utterance, the latter supposedly
"springing from" the act. There are "connecting circumstances,"
and thus the declarations are construed as "a part of the transac-
tion."' 0 There are very few cases which refrain from using this
catch-all phrase ("as a part of the res gestae"), yet most authori-
ties'1 favor either a complete abolition, or at most a very restricted
use of the term. The eminent Judge Learned Hand, in a recent
case, stated:
".... as for 'res gestae' it is a phrase which has been account-
able for so much confusion that it had best be denied any
place whatever in legal terminology; if it means anything
but an unwillingness to think at all, what it covers cannot
be put ir less intelligible terms."'
2
6Id. at §1761.
7 Cherry v. Slade, 9 N.C. 400 (1823).
8 Jones terms this doctrine "Spontaneous Utterance under Stress,"
Jones, Comm. on Evid. (2nd Ed.) §1750.
9 Thayer, Legal Essays (1927 Ed.) 244.
10 See for illustrations: Hill's Case, 2 Gratt 604 (Va.) (1845);
Merkle v. Bennington, 58 Mich. 163 (1885); Galena & C.U.R.R.Co. v.
Fay, 16 Ill. 568 (1855).
11 Prof. Morgan believes the courts using it are avoiding an analysis
of the situations involved. Morgan, A Suggested Classification of
Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae (1922) 31 Yale L. J. 229. Dean
Wigmore states that it ought never be used. Wigmore, supra note 2, at
§1767. Prof. Thayer considers the phrase a "catch-all." Thayer, loc.
cit. supra note 9.
12 United States v. Matot, 146 F. (2d) 197, 198 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1944).
SPONTANEOUS EXCLAMATIONS
The essentials of the doctrine of "spontaneous exclamations" were
first used by Lord Holt in 1693 in an action for assault and battery
upon the wife of the plaintiff.' 3 Lord Ellenborough later enveloped
the statement in a fog of "res gestae"; and, though this doctrine
was repudiated in Bedingfield's Case,'4 it was widely recognized in
England before being so recognized here. In the United States few
gave any weight directly to the element of spontaneity or its
emphasis,' 5 until after Dean Wigmore produced his monumental
treatise on Evidence, whereupon the courts recognized the doctrine
of "spontaneous exclamations" generally.' 6 Dean Wigmore's con-
cept of the scope and reason of the exception is that spontaneity
and not contemporaneousness is the test of admissibility. The state-
ment must be unreflective, and made before the declarant has time
to contrive anything to his advantage.' 7 The Arizona Supreme
Court recently defined a spontaneous exclamation as a statement
made immediately after some exciting occasion by a participant or
spectator asserting the circumstances of that occasion as he
observed it.*8
For an utterance to be admissible under the "spontaneous excla-
mation" doctrine it must meet these three requirements: 1) a
startling occasion; 2) a statement made before time to fabricate;
and 3) relation to the circumstances of the occurrence.' 9 The state-
ment does not have to be contemporaneous with the act. On the
other hand, however, one of the four limitations imposed on the
"verbal act" doctrine is that the words must be precisely contem-
poraneous with the act.20 Thus we see that the fallacy that under
the "spontaneous exclamations" doctrine the utterances must be
contemporaneous with the exciting cause, arises, where it does, as
the result of the mistaken application of the "verbal act" doctrine.
The true test of a spontaneous remark is not when the exclamation
was made, but whether under all the circumstances of the act the
speaker can be considered as having said it under the stress of
nervous excitement and shock, or whether this nervous excitement
had sufficiently died down so that the utterance was made under
reflection. One court aptly stated: "What the law altogether dis-
trusts is not after-speech, but after-thought."'2' For example, where
one is beaten into unconsciousness, the courts should admit into
,3Lord Holt "allowed that what the wife said immediately upon
the hurt received, and before she had time to devise or contrive anything
for her own advantage, might be given in evidence." Thomson v. Tre-
vanion, Skinner 402 (1693).
'4 R. v. Bedingfield, 14 Cox Cr. 341 (1879).
15 The term found early judicial use in Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga.
621 (1852).
16 Dean Wigmore first formulated the Spontaneous Exclamation
doctrine in 1898 when he edited the 16th edition of Greenleaf on
Evidence.
17 For an interesting article as to the value of "truth and accu-
racy" of spontaneous utterances see Hutchins and Slesinger, State of
Mind to Prove an Act, (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 283. See also, Spontaneity
as Basis of an Exception to Hearsay Rule (1931) 6 Rocky Mt. L. R. 391,
and Note (1938) 22 Minn. L. R. 391.
18 Lockwood, J., in Keefe v. State, 50 Ariz. 293, 72 P. (2d) 425 (1937).
'9 Wigmore, supra note 2, at §1750.
20 The other three limitations are: 1) There must be a main or
principal act, relevant under the issue; 2) The words must genuinely
elucidate or give character to this act; 3) The words must be by the
actor himself. Wigmore, supra note 2, at §1752.
21 Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Sheppard, 85 Ga. 751, 775, 776, 12 S.E. 18
(1898).
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evidence any spontaneous statements made by him after regaining
consciousness, though these statements be made several days later.
"There can be no definite and fixed limit of time. Each case must
depend upon its own circumstances." 22 Most authorities agree that
the time element must and does vary with the circumstances of
each case.2
The facts in State -v. Buck,24 a New Mexico case, were similar to
those in the principal case. There the defendant husband had beaten
and severely wounded his wife, fracturing her skull and beating
her face to a pulpy mass. She escaped and ran to her neighbor's
home two miles away where she related what had happened. She
also told these facts to the doctor who treated her some 4 hours
later. Upon her husband's trial she refused to testify, but both
statements were admitted under the spontaneous exclamation doc-
trine. The New Mexico court felt that, although sufficient time
may have elapsed for her to appraise her situation and for reflec-
tion, yet in view of her feelings of pain, resentment, humiliation,
and grief it was doubtful that she was capable of coherent thought,
connected reasoning, or deliberate utterances. These emotions are
the very ones meant to be given predominance in any unreflective
statements. It is easy to believe that under the immediate influence
of a horrible experience it was her physical and mental distress that
caused her to make the statements. For, as the court points out,
after reflection and deliberation (after conjugal love had overcome
resentment) Mrs. Buck refused to testify regarding the incident.25
The same reasoning can be applied to the instant case. After
escaping, Mrs. Stafford's only thoughts were to avoid being found
again by her husband. It is easy to imagine that one, under those
circumstances, would lie hidden in one spot, numbed with fear and
pain, for a considerable length of time, unable to think clearly,
much less move. Then also, the utterances she did make were the
first words spoken after the beating. The factor of pain alone
should be sufficient to give credence to the statements as being
unreflective. 26
Upon these considerations the court in the present case adopted
the liberal view advocated by Dean Wigmore and left the deter-
mination of spontaneity to the discretion of the trial court. For it
is the trial court which, from all the circumstances surrounding the
case, is in the best position to determine whether the statements
were spontaneous or otherwise. Though this court pays lip service
to the term "res gestae" it applies the doctrine of "spontaneous
exclamations," holding as the true test, not whether the declarations
were contemporaneous, but whether these statements were unre-
22Wigmore, supra note 2, at §1750.
23Jones stated: "admissibility depends more on circumstances than
on time." Jones, supra, note 7, at §1197. Wharton stated: "There
are no limits of time within which the 'res gestao' can be arbitrarily
confined. These limits vary, in fact, with each particular." Wharton,
Crim. Evid. (11th Ed.) Vol I, §495.
4 33 N.M. 334, 266 Pac. 917 (1927).
25 Ibid.
2 6 "Instead of struggling weakly for the impossible, they (the
courts) should decisively insist that every case be treated upon its own
circumstances. They should, if they are able, lift themselves sensibly
to the even greater height of leaving the application of the principle
absolutely to the determination of the trial court." Wigmore, supra
note 2, at §1750.
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flective, and spoken during a state of excitement. And for its
determination they leave much to the discretion of the trial court.
7
The action of this court evinces quite a change in the attitude of
appellate courts today as compared to the days of Justice Coleridge.
In an opinion written in 1838, Coleridge frankly admitted that the
appellate courts feared leaving this evidence to the discretion of
the trial court. 28 The change in this attitude was expressed by
David D. Field while preparing a draft of the New York Code of
Civil Procedure.29 He stated that the fundamental difference be-
tween the system of evidence provided for, and that previously used,
was that the present plan tries to admit all the light possible, while
the previous theory was that of exclusion of light upon the feeling
that it might deceive someone.
A proper consideration of the hearsay rule in a ease such as the
instant one would render unnecessary the use of the term "res
gestae." The term is very confusing and ought to be abolished or
at least restricted to the "verbal act" doctrine where it is perhaps
applicable. Cases like the subject one should be considered under
the doctrine of "spontaneous exclamations." The problem of when
a particular utterance is spontaneous should be left to the discretion
of the trial court.
SAMUEL J. BAim.
27,"Whether a statement or declaration is part of the res gestae
should be left to the trial court's discretion, and, where no abuse of
discretion appears, trial court's ruling must stand." Musgrave v. Karis,
-Ariz,-, 163 P: (2d) 278 (1945). See accord: Christopherson v.
Chgo. M. & St. P. R.R. Co., 135 Iowa 409, 109 N.W. 1077, 1080, (1907) ;
Benton v. Regeser, 20 Ariz. 273, 179 Pac. 966 (1919) ; Perry v. Haritos,
100 Conn. 476, 124 Atl. 44, (1924); State v. McCrady, 152 Kan. 566.
106 P. (2d) 696, (1940) ; Page v. City of Osceola, 232 Iowa 1126, 5 N.W.
(2d) 593, (1942).2 8 Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 5 Ct. & Fin. 670 (1838).
29 New York Code Civil Procedure (1850), §1708, p. 715.
